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REGULATING AT THE MARGINS:  
NON-TRADITIONAL KINSHIP AND THE LEGAL 
REGULATION OF INTIMATE AND FAMILY LIFE 
Courtney Megan Cahill* 
This Article offers a new theory of how the law attempts to control intimate and 
family life and uses that theory to argue why certain laws might be 
unconstitutional. Specifically, it contends that by regulating non-traditional 
relationships and practices that receive little or no constitutional protection—
same-sex relationships, domestic partnerships, de facto parenthood, and non-
sexual procreation—the law is able to express its normative ideals about all 
marriage, parenthood, and procreation. By regulating non-traditional kinship, 
then, the law can be aspirational in a way that the Constitution would ordinarily 
prohibit and can attempt to channel all of us in ways that satisfy its normative 
ideals. This Article refers to this form of channeling or control as “back door” 
regulation, and maintains that by regulating at the margins, the law attempts to 
regulate everyone. In addition to offering a new theory of the family and its legal 
regulation, this Article uses that theory to enrich constitutional challenges to laws, 
like exclusionary marriage regimes, that selectively burden non-traditional 
intimacy and practices. Most broadly, it invites readers to consider how far the 
law reaches when it regulates as well as just how interconnected to one another 
the law’s regulation (and discrimination) makes us. 
                                                                                                            
    *  Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. Ph.D., 
Princeton University; J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Columbia University. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, scenario “A,” a white man 
uses an online dating service to meet a woman whom he would like to marry 
someday. Because the man is interested in eventually having white children with 
his wife, he checks “Caucasian” in the list of criteria provided by the service. 
Despite his desire to marry one white woman, the man routinely has unprotected 
sex with many women. 
The state in which the man lives passes two laws related to his activities. 
The first law provides that online dating services shall be subject to a sin-or-
sumptuary tax when they organize patrons on the basis of racial and ethnic 
background. The second law provides that a man commits a misdemeanor when he 
engages in unprotected sex with a woman other than his wife. In support of each 
law, the state cites antidiscrimination and health concerns, respectively. As to the 
health issue, the state is particularly concerned about the possibility that men will 
father many children who will not know each other, thus raising the specter of 
incest. The man challenges both laws in federal court, arguing that they violate his 
associational and privacy rights under the Federal Constitution, and likely wins.1  
                                                                                                            
    1. The law that taxes online dating services that organize patrons on the basis of 
racial and ethnic background likely violates patrons’ right to associational freedom under 
the First Amendment and the so-called freedom of intimate association under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. For a description of the latter right, see Kenneth L. Karst, The 
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In the second scenario, scenario “B,” a white woman wants to have a 
child with her Hispanic female partner. They retain the services of the California 
Cryobank, the largest sperm bank in the world and located in California, and 
choose donor # 02493, a Hispanic male who has already successfully donated to 
four families. The woman and her partner select a Hispanic male because they are 
interested in having a child that shares their ethnic heritage. For this and other 
reasons, donor # 02493 is the perfect donor for them.  
Before the woman purchases # 02493, however, California passes two 
laws that relate to her activities. The first law places a large sin-or-sumptuary tax 
on sperm banks, like the California Cryobank, that organize donors on the basis of 
racial and ethnic background. The second law provides that it is a misdemeanor for 
sperm banks to sell donor sperm to more than three families or individuals who 
successfully bear children with that donor. The state cites antidiscrimination and 
health concerns in support of the laws. As to the health issue, California, like the 
state in A, is particularly concerned about the possibility of accidental incest 
between the biologically related siblings of popular sperm bank donors—siblings 
who likely will not know each other. It is worth noting that B is not just a 
hypothetical case, as commentators have started to argue that sperm banks should 
be regulated for just the reasons discussed here: to prevent incest and to promote 
race neutrality.2 
As a result of the sin tax, the Cryobank starts to charge its customers 
considerably higher rates for donor sperm. The high cost of Cryobank sperm, as 
well as the fact that # 02493 is now off limits because he has already helped create 
children in four families, force the woman to seek the services of a sperm bank in 
another state (even though # 02493 was the perfect match). The woman challenges 
California’s laws on federal constitutional grounds, arguing that they violate her 
right to procreate, and likely loses.3  
                                                                                                            
Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). Similarly, the law that makes it 
a misdemeanor for a man to have sexual relations with a woman who is not his wife is a 
criminal fornication law—a law that punishes extramarital sexual activity. While the 
Supreme Court has never directly considered the constitutionality of criminal fornication 
laws, it indirectly ruled on their constitutionality in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003). If, after Lawrence, it is constitutional to deny same-sex couples the ability to marry 
(as Lawrence itself suggests, see id. at 585) but unconstitutional to impose criminal 
penalties on them for engaging in consensual sex (as Lawrence explicitly holds, see id.), 
then it would seem that fornication laws must be unconstitutional because they criminalize 
the only kind of sexual activity (extramarital) that same-sex couples in most states can 
engage in. In Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 371 (Va. 2005), the Virginia Supreme Court 
agreed when it struck down that state’s criminal fornication statute in light of Lawrence.  
    2. See infra Part II.C.  
    3. In this case, no sexual autonomy rights are at issue because the woman is 
reproducing in a non-sexual way. She might argue that her associational rights are being 
violated here—specifically, her right to associate with the reproductive material of her 
choice. It is unlikely, however, that a court would look favorably on that claim given its 
somewhat attenuated relationship to associational autonomy. Thus, the woman in B is left 
with her right to procreate, which, according to Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) 
and its progeny, receives constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Although the Court decided Skinner on equality grounds, it has suggested in subsequent 
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What is going on here? Most obviously, perhaps, the man in A likely 
wins because he is engaging in constitutionally protected activity (sex) and in 
something (online dating) that not only involves associational autonomy but also 
might lead to constitutionally protected activity (sex and marriage). By contrast, 
the woman in B likely loses because she is engaging in neither of those things. 
Instead, hers is a non-sexual, and non-traditional, form of procreation that arguably 
neither constitutes a fundamental right4 nor involves the same sort of activity that 
we typically associate with the constitutionally protected activities of sexual 
reproduction and romantic affiliation. As one commentator recently put it, 
“Autonomy interests are implicated differently in assisted reproduction . . . than 
they are in sexual reproduction or romantic dating.”5 It therefore follows that the 
activity at issue in B can likely be subject to regulations that would surely be 
unconstitutional when applied to the activity at issue in A.  
But something else is going on here—something more than a simple case 
of government subjecting B to regulation in a way that would violate the 
Constitution if applied to A because B is non-traditional and therefore “not the 
stuff of which fundamental rights qualifying as liberty interests are made.”6 That 
is, if we simply read these scenarios as exemplifying a case where non-traditional 
activity (B) can be burdened in a way that traditional activity (A) cannot be, then 
we miss something important: the extent to which the law might be using B to 
                                                                                                            
cases that Skinner protects a fundamental right to procreate. See, e.g., Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). However, while Skinner established a right to 
procreate, what that procreative right actually encompasses remains highly contested. See, 
e.g., Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1135 (2008) (arguing for a “bundle of rights” theory of procreation). The right does not 
necessarily include the right to procreate via third-party assistance. See Radhika Rao, 
Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1473, 1483–89 (1995). For the argument 
that the right to procreate includes the right to noncoital procreation, see John A. Robertson, 
Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 914 (1996) 
[hereinafter Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology] (“Since an infertile couple or 
individual has the same interest in bearing and rearing offspring as a fertile couple does, 
their right to use noncoital techniques to treat infertility should have equivalent respect.”); 
John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 323, 328 (2005) (“If coital reproduction is protected, then we might 
reasonably expect the courts to protect the right of infertile persons to use noncoital means 
of reproduction to combine their gametes, such as artificial insemination.”). Still, even if the 
woman in B has a right to noncoital procreation, it is unclear whether that right includes the 
right to a sperm donor of her choice. For an argument that it does, see John A. Robertson, 
Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 
59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 956 n.53 (1986) [hereinafter Robertson, Embryos] (“The recipient 
of [sperm] donation . . . may have the full procreative interest, even if the donor does not. 
Thus, persons desiring to reproduce may have a right to receive gametes and gestation from 
others, even if the others have no independent right to provide those services.”).  
    4. See supra note 3.  
    5. Dov Fox, Note, Racial Classification and Assisted Reproduction, 118 YALE 
L.J. 1844, 1882 (2009). Fox’s argument is set forth in greater detail below. See infra notes 
95–96 and accompanying text.  
    6. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989). 
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articulate normative ideals about what all intimate and family life ought to look 
like.  
In more concrete terms, constitutional guarantees prohibit the law from 
directly forcing the man in A to procreate in race-neutral ways and from directly 
setting limits on the number of times that he “donates” sperm to women. Those 
guarantees do not, however, prohibit the law from regulating the similar non-
traditional activity at issue in B because B, unlike A, is not constitutionally 
protected. Nor, importantly, do those guarantees prohibit the law from using the 
legal regulation of B as an opportunity to express its strong normative 
commitments regarding all procreation—including the traditional procreative 
activity in A that is constitutionally protected. When viewed in this light, B 
presents an occasion for the law to articulate normative ideals for everyone. It is in 
this scenario that the law’s thick normative commitments regarding all 
procreation—in this case, the law’s belief that procreation should be race neutral 
and incest preventative—find expression.  
This Article provides a new theory of the family that has both descriptive 
and practical importance. Its general goal is to offer a novel way to think about 
how the law attempts to control intimate and familial life and to establish an ideal 
conception of it. Its narrow objective is to use that theory as a basis for arguing 
why certain regulations, like those imposed on same-sex partners or on alternative 
procreation, might be unconstitutional.  
More specifically, this Article argues that non-traditional kinship presents 
an occasion for the law to articulate its normative vision of all intimate and family 
life, including reproduction, romantic affiliation, and family formation. Notably, 
family law has overlooked this phenomenon because of the conventional way in 
which it conceptualizes the connection between traditional and non-traditional 
relationships and practices. For instance, family law approaches the traditional 
nuclear family and the non-traditional marginal family as if they occupy distinct 
and separate domains.7 Moreover, it assumes that the marginal family is dominated 
by and subsidiary to its central counterpart—or, to use a metaphor often invoked 
by family law commentators, it assumes that non-traditional kinship sits in the 
“shadow” of traditional kinship.8 Finally, it assumes that the marginal family is 
highly regulated by the state, whereas the central family, protected as it is by 
constitutional privacy guarantees, is rarely subject to regulation.9  
Thinking about the family and its legal regulation in this way is 
problematic for two reasons. First, family law’s conventional understanding of the 
relationship between traditional and non-traditional kinship is descriptively 
inaccurate. It approaches those kinship forms as separate and distinct, when, in 
fact, they are dynamically interrelated. Moreover, it assumes that marginal kinship 
is dominated by traditional models, when, in fact, marginal kinship helps to define 
those models. And it presupposes that traditional kinship is never regulated, when, 
in fact, the law regulates it all the time—albeit indirectly at the margins. This 
                                                                                                            
    7. See infra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.  
    8. See infra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.  
    9. See infra notes 20–25 and accompanying text.  
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Article contends that when the law uses marginality to articulate a normative 
vision of intimate and family life, it is regulating through the “back door” that 
which the Constitution prohibits it from regulating directly—namely, traditional 
kinship. Viewed in this light, the law’s regulation of marginal kinship constitutes 
an underhanded way to gain access to traditional forms of intimate and family life 
that the Constitution staunchly protects—the very definition of a “back door.”10  
Second, family law’s conventional narrative has certain practical costs, 
particularly for those interested in challenging the constitutionality of laws that 
burden non-traditional intimacy and family life, such as exclusionary marriage 
laws. That narrative overlooks the extent to which the law uses non-traditional 
kinship as a vehicle through which to express a normative vision of kinship for 
everyone. As a result, advocates have missed the opportunity to make a novel 
constitutional argument: that the law imposes expressive or normative burdens on 
non-traditional kinship and that those expressive or normative burdens sometimes 
(although not always) amount to a constitutional equality violation.  
Part I sets forth family law’s conventional view of the relationship 
between traditional and non-traditional kinship. Part II challenges that view by 
focusing on a number of instances from the family law context where the law uses 
marginality to express strong normative commitments about intimate and family 
life generally. Part III builds on these illustrations to demonstrate that the law uses 
marginality to try to regulate everyone; as such, it would not be improper to think 
about the legal regulation of non-traditional kinship as an attempt to regulate even 
traditional kinship, albeit through the back door. Finally, Part IV contemplates 
some of the practical uses to which this Article’s descriptive theory of the family 
and its legal regulation may be put, including the ways in which it might be used to 
enrich constitutional challenges to regulations that burden marginal kinship, 
including, but not limited to, exclusionary marriage regimes.  
Commentators have long theorized the relationship between traditional 
and non-traditional models in American family law. Some commentators argue 
that traditional models, like marriage, are constraining; under this view, those 
models overshadow non-traditional kinship to such a degree that the latter is never 
truly free to express itself in new and exciting ways.11 Others argue that traditional 
                                                                                                            
  10. While technically the entrance at the rear of a building or a house, “back 
door” is also a term that refers to a secret means of gaining access to something highly 
protected. Beyond its colloquial usage, “back door” is a term that computer programmers 
use to refer to hidden software tools that can be used to bypass a computer system’s security 
policies in order to gain access to it. See Glossary, IMVAJRA, http://www.imvajra.com/ 
glossary1.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2011). This latter usage is a nice metaphor for the kind 
of back door regulation that this Article has in mind when it describes the ways in which the 
law tries to gain access to the traditional family—something highly protected by the 
Constitution—by regulating the non-traditional family.  
  11. See, e.g., Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting 
Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 1020 (2000) (“[C]ontemporary performance-based 
approaches to nonmarital cohabitation posit marriage as the reigning normative model 
against which nonsolemnized unions are compared and against which their legal merits are 
evaluated.”); Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2689 
(2008) (“The normative centrality and, indeed, priority of the institution of marriage 
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legal relationships, like marriage, are liberating; under this view, traditional 
relationships offer considerable freedom vis-à-vis their non-traditional 
counterparts because the state so heavily regulates the latter but not the former.12  
This Article enhances and challenges both of those accounts. It argues 
that traditional kinship not only sits in the shadow of its non-traditional counterpart 
but also is less free, and more regulated, than we might think. Its novel descriptive 
theory invites commentators and advocates to think more seriously about the 
distinctly expressive burdens that non-traditional intimate and family life bear in 
our legal order and about how those burdens are unconstitutional. Moreover, and 
equally important, its theory asks readers to consider just how far the law reaches 
when it regulates as well as just how interconnected the law’s regulation (and 
discrimination) makes us. 
I. LAW, INTIMATE LIFE, AND FAMILY:  
THE CONVENTIONAL NARRATIVE 
A. The Conventional Family Law Narrative 
Family law projects a certain narrative about the relationship between 
traditional and non-traditional kinship. First, and most broadly, family law 
assumes that central and marginal kinship structures are largely separate and 
disconnected. Central kinship, as its name suggests, is the traditional “nuclear” 
family—that is, the married heterosexual couple with biologically related children 
who are the product of sexual reproduction. Marginal kinship, by contrast, is the 
non-traditional family that fails to conform to the nuclear ideal for any number of 
reasons.  
Family law often organizes intimate and family life in a way suggesting 
that traditional and non-traditional kinship structures inhabit non-overlapping 
domains. For instance, my students’ casebook reserves an entirely separate section 
for what it terms “non-traditional families,” which, according to the book’s editors, 
include individuals engaged in same-sex relationships and non-marital 
                                                                                                            
establishes the standard by which all other forms of kinship, family, friendship, temporary 
alliance, and love are both rendered legible and assigned value. In this, and in most 
societies, marriage is the measure of all things.”); Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, 
Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236, 1256 (2010) (“[S]eeming departures from 
the marital family ideal may be less radical than they first appear. Just as unmarried fathers 
were recognized as fathers when they acted like husbands, unmarried couples have 
sometimes enjoyed legal protection because they acted as though they were married.”).  
  12. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A 
Comment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 
1643, 1665 (1993) [hereinafter Case, Couples and Coupling] (discussing the freedom that 
marriage provides vis-à-vis non-traditional alternatives like domestic partnerships, which 
require individuals to satisfy a laundry list of criteria that married couples do not have to 
satisfy); Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1774 (2005) (same); 
Mary Anne Case, What Feminists Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 57 UCLA 
L. REV. 1199, 1203–05 (2010) [hereinafter Case, What Feminists Have to Lose] (same).  
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cohabitation.13 By contrast, the casebook considers the traditional family—the 
heterosexual married couple with biological children—under the section entitled 
“Marriage and Divorce.”14 This way of thinking about the family is also present in 
family law scholarship and case law, each of which tends to conceptualize intimate 
and familial life as falling into either a central or a marginal type and to approach 
those types in a static and non-dynamic way.15  
                                                                                                            
  13. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 839–943 
(5th ed. 2010).  
  14. Id. at 73–202; see also D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, 
MODERN FAMILY LAW (4th ed. 2009) (treating traditional and non-traditional families 
separately).  
  15. For scholarship that divides intimate and family life along traditional and 
non-traditional lines, see, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Law in the Cultivation of Hope, 95 CALIF. 
L. REV. 319, 380 (2006) (referring to same-sex relationships as “non-traditional”); Susan 
Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 41 (2008) (placing 
same-sex relationships under the larger category of “nontraditional relationships”); Carlos 
A. Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 443, 515 (2000) (drawing 
a distinction between “married couples” and “nontraditional couples”); Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives 
When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 882–83 (1984) 
(drawing a distinction between the traditional nuclear family and “parenting relationships” 
that arise “outside the nuclear family”); Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real 
Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1147–55 (2003) (referring to gay families as “alternatives” and 
making the traditional/non-traditional family distinction but also criticizing that distinction); 
Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 
23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 77–78 (2008) (characterizing children raised by a 
single parent or by same-sex parents as examples of “nontraditional parenthood”); Note, 
Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal 
Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1642–57 (1998) (examining and critiquing 
the differential legal treatment of traditional and non-traditional families); Nancy D. 
Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of 
Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 472–73 
(1990) (referring to lesbian-headed families as non-traditional but also noting the 
shortcomings of that categorization because lesbian-headed households are by no means 
new). For examples of an alternative perspective, one that critiques the traditional/non-
traditional or core–marginal distinction, see KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: 
LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP 7 (1997) (“[N]uclear families do not constitute the timeless core 
of what it means to have kin in this society, relative to which all other forms of family must 
appear as derivative variations or marginal alternatives.”); Marsha Garrison, The 
Technological Family: What’s New and What’s Not, 33 FAM. L.Q. 691, 691 (1999) (arguing 
that what might look non-traditional is actually quite ordinary); Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse, “It All Depends on What You Mean by Home”: Toward a Communitarian 
Theory of the “Nontraditional” Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569, 570 (critiquing use of term 
“nontraditional” to describe so-called non-traditional families because “the term 
‘nontraditional’ is a misnomer. Households that depart from the nuclear model have existed 
for all of human history.”). Cases have also employed the traditional/non-traditional 
distinction. See, e.g., Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 
88743, at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (referring to same-sex marriage as a non-
traditional relationship that is deserving of constitutional protection), superseded by 
constitutional amendment, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (amended 1999); In re Interest of 
Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 203–04, 210 n.14 (Wis. 1991) (referring to a lesbian parent as 
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Second, family law assumes that traditional forms of intimate and familial 
life dominate their non-traditional counterparts. For instance, some family law 
commentators have conceptualized traditional kinship—specifically, heterosexual 
marriage—as the “center” that casts its “shadow” over non-traditional alternatives, 
including non-marriage (singledom) and domestic partnerships.16 Katherine 
Franke, for example, has understood the relationship between formal marriage and 
domestic partnerships in center–margin terms, contending that marriage so often 
casts its “shadow” over those who are peripheral to it.17 Franke notes that marriage 
casts its shadow widely, constituting the legal relationship against which all other 
relationships, including domestic partnerships, are defined and determined.18 She 
says that “those who fall within marriage’s shadow find themselves locked into a 
social field in which the attachments we take up have meaning already determined 
by the state.”19 Under this view, a non-traditional structure (domestic partnerships) 
is forever sitting in the “shadow” of, and is thus in some sense determined and 
dominated by, a traditional structure (marriage).  
Third and last, family law assumes that traditional intimate and family life 
is rarely regulated whereas its marginal counterpart is always regulated. “While 
family law has expanded to embrace non-traditional relationships and family 
structures,” one commentator observes, “the courts’ close scrutiny of these 
relationships and structures demonstrates their continued preference for the 
traditional family unit.”20 Indeed, “the premise of the nuclear family underlies the 
legal norm of parental autonomy,”21 and “the traditional respect for privacy 
afforded to the family as a unit evaporates when the traditional family form 
disappears.”22 As Professor Rao argues, “The very concept of family privacy—the 
constitutional doctrine protecting a ‘private realm of family life which the state 
may not enter’—presupposes a ‘natural family’ that exists apart from and prior to 
                                                                                                            
being in a non-traditional relationship), overruled by In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 
N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995). Although this Article refers to kinship in traditional/non-
traditional terms, it also understands the interrelationship that exists between them.  
  16. See, e.g., Grace Ganz Blumberg, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Conjugal 
Relationships: The 2003 California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act in 
Comparative Civil Rights and Family Law Perspective, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1555, 1557 
(2004) (invoking the shadow metaphor); Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: 
Single Women and the Legal Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 
1656–59, 1709–14 (2003) (same); Franke, supra note 11, at 2693–99 (same).  
  17. Franke, supra note 11, at 2693–99.  
  18. Id. at 2697–99.  
  19. Id. at 2697.  
  20. Aubry Holland, Comment, The Modern Family Unit: Toward a More 
Inclusive Vision of the Family in Immigration Law, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2008). 
  21. Bartlett, supra note 15, at 880.  
  22. Katharine K. Baker, Taking Care of Our Daughters, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1495, 1503–04 (1997) (book review); see also David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family 
Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 581 (2000) (“Never-married or divorced parents are 
subjected to state investigation and direction on a scale that would be considered 
unthinkable in the context of married parents in an intact family. . . . It bears remembering 
that the first cases recognizing what later came to be known as the constitutional right of 
family privacy involved state intrusions upon intact and unified families.”). 
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the state.”23 “Implicit in this image,” she continues, “but seldom articulated, is the 
fundamental assumption that the natural family consists of two heterosexual 
parents and their biological children.”24 According to this view, the law has 
adopted a “hands-on” approach to the marginal family that it would never think of 
applying to the traditional family, that “freestanding thing, or phenomenon, or 
group [that] is distinct from . . . the state.”25 
B. Challenging the Conventional Family Law Narrative 
Family law’s conventional view of the relationship between traditional 
and non-traditional kinship is descriptively imprecise and warrants critique. For 
instance, the notion that traditional and non-traditional kinship inhabit separate, 
distinct, and largely non-overlapping spheres (think here of the casebook 
organization mentioned above) fails to capture the dynamic interrelationship that 
exists between them. Similarly, the notion that marginal kinship is forever 
dominated by central kinship (think here of the “shadow” metaphor) fails to 
account for the extent to which central forms of intimacy and family so often take 
shape in the shadow of their marginal counterparts. And finally, the notion that 
“the traditional respect for privacy afforded to the family as a unit evaporates when 
the traditional family form disappears”26 fails to account for the extent to which 
the central family is regulated, albeit indirectly at the margins. Reconceptualizing 
the role that marginality plays in the law’s construction of intimate and family life, 
as described in the next Parts, offers a more accurate way to think about the family 
and its legal regulation, as well as a new way to think about why directly 
regulating certain forms of non-traditional kinship might be unconstitutional.  
II. RECONCEIVING MARGINALITY 
Scholars have long recognized the powerful role that marginal people and 
relationships can play in defining a normative vision of social life for everyone. 
Those who “have moved outside the margins of a group,” one sociologist writes, 
help to give society “its distinctive shape, its unique identity.”27 The “latest 
                                                                                                            
  23.  Radhika Rao, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Threat to the 
Traditional Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 960 (1996) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).  
  24. Id. One time that the Supreme Court did articulate as much was in Smith v. 
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (upholding state removal procedures 
of foster children from their foster homes against a federal due process challenge). There, 
the Court observed that “the usual understanding of ‘family’ implies biological 
relationships, and most decisions treating the relation between parent and child have 
stressed this element.” Id. at 843. For a more recent expression of this idea, see Long v. 
Holtry, 673 F. Supp. 2d 341, 350 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (noting that foster family formations exist 
“in contrast to traditional family relationships whose origins are entirely apart from the 
power of the State, but are intrinsic to notions of freedom and liberty that are inherent in the 
very foundation of our country”). 
  25. Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Family as a System: A Preliminary Sketch, 1996 
UTAH L. REV. 537, 542.  
  26. Baker, supra note 22, at 1503–04. 
  27. KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
DEVIANCE 11 (1966).  
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marginal group,” one historian explains, serves the vital function of defining the 
center “by demonstrating what [the center] must never become.”28 In fact, 
marginalized people and behavior are “a natural and even beneficial part of social 
life” because they “mark the outer limits of group experience and provide a point 
of contrast which gives the norm some scope and dimension.”29 Under this view, 
we use whatever or whomever lies outside of us in order to define ourselves.30  
This Article takes this central insight and alters it slightly. Unlike many 
scholarly accounts of marginality, it does not argue that marginal forms of intimate 
and family life provide “a point of contrast which gives the norm some scope and 
dimension.”31 Rather, it contends that non-traditional relationships and 
reproductive practices constitute a vehicle through which the law attempts to 
articulate the “norm” for everyone. In this sense, this Article follows in the 
footsteps of those family law commentators who have argued that core legal 
concepts, like marriage and the family, often come into focus when the law 
regulates persons who exist at the periphery of those institutions. As Ariela Dubler 
has maintained, the normative meaning of marriage has so frequently taken shape 
“in the terrain beyond marriage’s formal borders.”32  
This Part’s objective is to offer examples of situations where marginality 
helps to bring family law’s central normative structures—ideal marriage, ideal 
parenthood, and ideal procreation—into focus. These examples are meant to be 
illustrative, not exhaustive. Each demonstrates the subtle interplay between central 
and marginal kinship, the expressive burdens that the law so often places on 
marginal kinship, and the indirect way in which the law attempts to regulate even 
those aspects of intimate and family life that receive robust constitutional 
                                                                                                            
  28. JAMES A. MORONE, HELLFIRE NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 9, 46 (2003).  
  29. ERIKSON, supra note 27, at 27.  
  30. See Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of 
Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 287 (1995) (“At least since the time of 
G.H. Mead we have understood that even the interior self is hard to imagine in the absence 
of ‘others’ out there. In the prevailing individualized, Western, Freud-schooled, 
‘masculinist’ world view, those others are the ones from whom the individual self is to be 
distinguished.”).  
  31. ERIKSON, supra note 27, at 27.  
  32. Dubler, supra note 16, at 1649; see also HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE 
IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 1 (2000) (observing that it is “through close examination of 
struggles at the margins of marital life and marital identities . . . that we come to a historical 
understanding of core legal concepts: of wife, of husband, of unity”). This Article 
recognizes that core legal concepts like marriage and the family are also brought into focus 
and given substance when the law acts in other ways not considered here. My focus here is 
on the law’s regulation of marginal kinship in the family law context. But the law also tries 
to define core legal concepts through the criminal law, which projects an ideal vision of the 
family (as nonviolent, mutually supportive, etc.), and through immigration law, which 
projects an ideal vision of marriage (as an institution based on love, financial 
interdependence, etc.). See infra notes 62, 69, 147–49 and accompanying text. I focus here 
instead on the under-theorized expressive dimension of the law’s direct regulation of 
marginal relationships and reproductive practices through mechanisms like exclusionary 
marriage regimes and domestic partnership laws.  
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protection. In each, regulating at the margins affords the law an opportunity to 
express its normative ideals about a variety of institutions that we do not always 
think about in statist terms.  
A. Same-Sex Marriage and Domestic Partnerships: Creating the Ideal Marriage 
1. Same-Sex Marriage 
The movement for marriage equality in the United States has given the 
law an occasion to articulate familial norms and what Professor Mary Anne Case 
has called a “thick” vision of marriage for everyone,33 even—or perhaps 
especially—heterosexuals. Interestingly, that movement has produced an image of 
marriage as procreative—an oddity, to say the least, in twenty-first-century 
America, where most people are thought to marry for love and companionship 
rather than for reproduction.34 Dismissed by many as nonsensical,35 the image of 
procreative marriage that has emerged from marriage-equality jurisprudence is 
best understood when viewed through a normative lens: an attempt to articulate 
what marriage should ideally be rather than a description of what it actually is.  
In those jurisdictions that have upheld exclusionary marriage laws against 
a constitutional challenge, courts have relied heavily on the procreation rationale. 
According to that argument, persons of the same sex can be denied the legal ability 
to marry each other because they cannot sexually procreate with each other.36 
                                                                                                            
  33. See Case, What Feminists Have to Lose, supra note 12, at 1204 (arguing that 
a thick view of marriage has emerged from same-sex marriage advocacy).  
  34. See, e.g., HARTOG, supra note 32, at 312 (describing the twentieth-century 
marriage as one in which spouses can “express creatively our individuality, our shared 
identity, and our changing commitments, our love”); Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, 
Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex Couples and the Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation, 21 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 10 (2009) (describing “the rise of companionate marriage, in which 
spouses are expected to satisfy each other’s emotional needs”).  
  35. See, e.g., Abrams & Brooks, supra note 34, at 4 (“[N]ever before have courts 
so truncated the possible purposes of marriage to assign it one goal: here, the policing of 
accidental procreation.”); Kenji Yoshino, Too Good for Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 
2006, at A19 (describing one court’s early invocation of one version of the procreation 
rationale as a “cockeyed aberration” that has gained acceptance by later courts).  
  36. The role of procreation in marriage-equality jurisprudence has changed over 
the past 40 years. During the first wave of marriage litigation in the 1970s and 1980s, courts 
justified exclusionary marriage laws on the basis of propagation of the species. Under this 
view, same-sex couples could be denied the right to marry the person of their choice 
because a same-sex marriage could not contribute to “the propagation of the human race.” 
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); see also Adams v. Howerton, 
486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (upholding California’s marriage exclusion on 
the basis of procreation as propagation of the species); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 
186–87 (Minn. 1971) (same with respect to Minnesota’s marriage law). Increasingly, 
however, courts have turned to a kinder, gentler variation of the procreation justification, 
one that ironically casts same-sex couples as superior to their cross-sex counterparts. Under 
this modified version, marriage is about encouraging responsible procreation between those 
who accidentally procreate and about providing a stable context in which such responsible 
procreation can occur. Because same-sex couples always reproduce responsibly—that is, 
they ostensibly never have children by accident—it follows that they do not need marriage. 
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While years ago “[t]he argument from procreation . . . no longer seem[ed] to be 
either advanced seriously by states or taken seriously by courts,”37 many courts 
today have embraced it.38 In fact, according to some commentators, procreation is 
“probably the most common argument against gay marriage” in certain circles.39  
The procreation rationale has been the object of intense criticism, with 
some commentators—and, recently, courts—bemoaning its flagrant under-
inclusiveness, and with others arguing that it bears no relationship whatsoever to 
exclusionary marriage legislation because the contemporary civil institution of 
marriage has nothing to do with procreation, if it ever did at all.40 Even Justice 
Scalia noted in his Lawrence v. Texas dissent that the procreation rationale for 
marriage prohibitions is wildly suspect because “the sterile and the elderly” may 
marry, though their chance for conception is about zero.41  
The conventional explanation for procreation’s success in the same-sex 
marriage context runs something like this: True, the law, through the procreation 
rationale, burdens same-sex couples in a way that it does not similarly burden 
opposite-sex couples. But that is because it can. The Supreme Court has cast the 
right to marry, or at least the right to enter into a traditional marriage, as one of 
fundamental importance.42 Moreover, it has made more than clear that a right of 
“marital privacy” protects couples, once married, from excessive governmental 
interference.43 Were the law to require married opposite-sex couples to procreate 
                                                                                                            
See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 463 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2003) (invoking responsible procreation); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 25–
26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (same).  
  37. Peter Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of 
“Public Morality” Qualify as Legitimate Governmental Interests for the Purposes of Equal 
Protection Review?, 87 GEO. L.J. 139, 151 (1998).  
  38. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 619 (Md. 2007) (upholding the 
state’s same-sex marriage prohibition partly on the basis of procreation); Hernandez v. 
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (same); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 978 
(Wash. 2006) (same).  
  39. Dale Carpenter, Bad Arguments Against Gay Marriage, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. 
REV. 181, 193 (2005); see also William C. Duncan, The State Interests in Marriage, 2 AVE 
MARIA L. REV. 153, 154 (2004) (“The most common state interest discussed in same-sex 
marriage case law relates to procreation . . . .”).  
  40. See, e.g., Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 389 (D. Mass. 
2010) (ruling that section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which defines 
marriage for federal purposes as a legally recognized union between one man and one 
woman, fails to satisfy rational basis review under the Federal Constitution and observing 
that the procreation rationale in support of that legislation “plainly cannot provide a rational 
basis upon which to exclude same-sex marriages from federal recognition because . . . the 
ability to procreate is not now, nor has it ever been, a precondition to marriage in any state 
in the country”); Courtney Megan Cahill, The Genuine Article: A Subversive Economic 
Perspective on the Law’s Procreationist Vision of Marriage, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 393, 
400–15 (2007); Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1397–98 (2010). 
  41. 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
  42. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 
(1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
  43. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
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to either get or stay married, it would surely be violating those rights. As one state 
court, responding to the claim that the procreation rationale is irrational because 
opposite-sex married couples do not need to procreate, put it: “[I]f the State 
excluded opposite-sex couples from marriage based on their intention or ability to 
procreate, the State would have to inquire about that subject before issuing a 
license, thereby implicating constitutionally rooted privacy concerns.”44  
In most states, and under the Federal Constitution, same-sex couples do 
not enjoy these constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, non-traditional kinship 
structures in general do not receive the constitutional protections that traditional 
kinship structures receive.45 It therefore follows that the law may impose an image 
of procreative marriage on same-sex couples without “implicating constitutionally 
rooted privacy concerns.”46  
But there is another way to think about the role that procreation is playing 
in the marriage-equality context, one that focuses less on why that rationale either 
does or does not make sense on a descriptive level and more on its normative 
dimension. Specifically, the legal regulation surrounding marginal kinship—here, 
the entire movement for marriage equality—allows the law to articulate what 
marriage should ideally be for everyone (namely, procreative), even, or rather 
especially, for those whom the law cannot directly regulate without running afoul 
of constitutionally guaranteed rights. As New York Times columnist Ross Douthat 
recently observed, the image of procreative marriage that has emerged from 
marriage-equality jurisprudence only makes sense when viewed normatively. In 
his words: “So what are gay marriage’s opponents really defending, if not some 
universal, biologically inevitable institution? It’s a particular vision of marriage, 
rooted in a particular tradition, that establishes a particular sexual ideal.”47 
Similarly, Professor David Cruz has argued that courts’ invocation of procreation 
in the marriage-equality context is an instance of “heterosexual reproductive 
imperatives” at work in the law—that is, an opportunity for the law to articulate 
                                                                                                            
  44. Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 462 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).  
  45. See, e.g., Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1974) (finding that 
the non-traditional family does not receive the same kind of constitutional protection that 
the traditional family receives); John C. v. Martha A., 592 N.Y.S.2d 229, 232 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 
1992) (stating that while “[a]n individual’s right to privacy in an intimate relationship is 
fundamental to human freedom and personal integrity [and] is now firmly rooted in our 
law,” those privacy norms are less robust in the context of a “nontraditional familial 
relationship”). But see Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 
88743, at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (“Just as the ‘decision to marry and raise a 
child in a traditional family setting’ is constitutionally protected as a fundamental right, so 
too should the decision to choose one’s life partner and have a recognized nontraditional 
family be constitutionally protected. . . . The same constitution protects both [kinds of 
families].”), superseded by constitutional amendment, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (amended 
1999). 
  46. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 462.  
  47. Ross Douthat, The Marriage Ideal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2010, at A19. 
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“ideals that are normative and thus nonfalsifiable.”48 The procreation rationale, in 
short, represents law’s “repronormativity” writ large.49  
The procreation rationale thus has a normative aspect that conventional 
explanations, criticisms, and discussions of it likely miss. Through it, the law is 
able to express its deepest normative commitments about all forms of marriage—
opposite-sex and same-sex alike—and to have a conversation about that institution 
that the Constitution would ordinarily prohibit. It turns out, then, that the 
procreation rationale is not only about burdening same-sex couples with a 
requirement that they could not possibly satisfy. It is also about affording the state 
an occasion to shape the social understanding of marriage for everyone. When 
viewed in this light, the marriage-equality movement and the role that procreation 
has played in it typify law regulating at the margins—that is, law using the 
marginal (same-sex relationships) to help create the ideal center (marriage for all).  
In this sense, the procreation rationale plays a role similar to that 
performed by another rationale often invoked in support of exclusionary marriage 
laws: the “children are best served when raised in a household with two biological, 
opposite-sex parents” rationale.50 To be sure, myriad households exist in which 
children are raised either by one parent (biological or not) or by two non-biological 
parents (as in the case of adoptive households). Moreover, the state would surely 
violate the Constitution were it to require that parent–child relationships be united 
by biological ties.51 For these reasons, the two-biological-parent rationale is best—
and perhaps only—understood when viewed normatively: the law’s attempt to 
defend a particular familial ideal and to regulate indirectly that which it cannot 
regulate directly.  
2. Domestic Partnerships 
Unmarried domestic partnerships provide another opportunity for the law 
to create the ideal marriage. Take, for instance, local and state domestic partner 
statutes, which extend a range of protections to those who statutorily qualify as 
                                                                                                            
  48. David B. Cruz, Heterosexual Reproductive Imperatives, 56 EMORY L.J. 1157, 
1166 (2007).  
  49. For a critique of the “repronormative forces” at play in law and feminism, 
see Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 181, 184 (2001). See also DAN MARKEL ET AL., PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH: 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES 125 (2009) (discussing the 
“repronormativity” that surrounds biological justifications for criminal and civil incest laws, 
which rest on the assumption that couples likely to engage in incest are both opposite-sex 
and procreative). 
  50. See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2005) 
(citing the United States’ argument in support of the Defense of Marriage Act—that DOMA 
“encourage[s] the creation of stable relationships that facilitate the rearing of children by 
both of their biological parents”); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (“The 
Legislature could rationally believe that it is better, other things being equal, for children to 
grow up with both a mother and a father.”).  
  51. It is worth noting, however, that the state would not violate the Constitution 
were it to prohibit households composed of unrelated individuals. See Vill. of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding a local zoning ordinance based on familial status).  
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domestic partners. The city of Tucson, Arizona, for instance, gives certain rights to 
domestic partners, defined as two people who “currently share a primary 
residence, are in a relationship of mutual support, and declare that they intend to 
remain in such for the indefinite future.”52 Cook County, Illinois, recognizes same-
sex couples as domestic partners if, among other things, they “share a common 
household” and are “in a close and committed relationship of mutual financial and 
emotional support.”53 In Lawrence, Kansas, domestic partners are persons who 
“share a common permanent residence,” “have agreed to be in a relationship of 
mutual interdependence,” and “both contribute to the maintenance and support of 
the household.”54 And in Rhode Island, domestic partners are entitled to funeral 
rights with respect to their deceased partner as long as they qualify as domestic 
partners under the relevant statute, which requires unmarried persons to show, 
among other things, that they “resided together and had resided together for at least 
one year at the time of death” and “were financially interdependent.”55  
Similarly, in 2000, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) set forth a 
detailed definition of domestic partner when it recommended that jurisdictions 
adopt domestic partnership legislation to protect parties to a relationship from the 
strategic behavior of those who will “avoid marriage in order to avoid 
responsibilities to a partner.”56 The ALI defines domestic partners as persons “who 
for a significant period of time share a primary residence and a life together as a 
couple.”57 It further maintains that “[w]hether persons share a life together as a 
couple is determined by reference to all the circumstances,”58 including, for 
example:  
(b) the extent to which the parties intermingled their finances;  
(c) the extent to which their relationship fostered the parties’ 
economic interdependence, or the economic dependence of one 
party upon the other;  
(d) the extent to which the parties engaged in conduct and 
assumed specialized or collaborative roles in furtherance of their life 
together;  
(e) the extent to which the relationship wrought change in the 
life of either or both parties;  
                                                                                                            
  52. City of Tucson Domestic Partner Registration Instructions, TUCSONAZ.GOV 
(Dec. 1, 2003), http://cms3.tucsonaz.gov/dprreg.  
  53. Domestic Partnership Affidavit, COOK COUNTY CLERK’S OFF., 
http://www.cookctyclerk.com/vitalrecords/DocumentLibrary/Domestic%20Partnership%20
Affidavit.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).  
  54. Domestic Partnership Registry, CITY OF LAWRENCE, KAN., 
http://www.lawrenceks.org/city_clerk/domestic_partnership_registry (last visited Dec. 28, 
2011).  
  55. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-33.2-24 (2011).  
  56. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.02 cmt. b (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].  
  57. Id. § 6.03(1). 
  58. Id. § 6.03(7).  
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(f) the extent to which the parties acknowledged 
responsibilities to each other . . . ; 
(g) the extent to which the parties’ relationship was treated by 
the parties as qualitatively distinct from the relationship either party 
had with any other person; [and]  
(h) the emotional or physical intimacy of the parties’ 
relationship . . . .59 
Some commentators argue that domestic partnership statutes such as the 
ALI’s force non-traditional relationships to conform to a marital model.60 But that 
argument is not quite right because it assumes that a marital model exists for the 
law to impose on non-traditional relationships in the first place. A better, or at least 
an additional, way to read these statutes is this: Domestic partnership statutes 
constitute a way for the law to create a marital model.  
More specifically, domestic partnership statutes operate as a vehicle 
through which the law expresses its most aspirational commitments about all 
relationships, particularly those that it cannot reach directly.61 Unlike domestic 
partners, married persons do not need to effect change in each other’s lives. They 
do not need to have a unique relationship. And they do not need to be physically 
intimate in order to receive the same protections that domestic partners might be 
eligible to receive. To be sure, married persons do not even need to be in love.62 
                                                                                                            
  59. Id.  
  60. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 11, at 2697 (“The intended effect of the ALI 
Principles is to enlarge marriage’s shadow.”).  
  61. In this sense, domestic partnership statutes play a role similar to that played 
by functional definitions of intimate relationships and family generally. The New York 
Court of Appeals’ decision in Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989), 
has been called the “high water mark” with respect to this functionalist approach. Nan D. 
Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9, 22, 23 
(1991). There, the court considered whether two men in an intimate relationship qualified as 
a “family” for the purpose of a city’s rent control statute. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 54–55. The 
court concluded that because the men had sufficiently acted like a family, they qualified as 
one under the law. Id. The court in particular noted that the men were financially 
interdependent, had a long and exclusive relationship, were emotionally committed to each 
other, and relied on each other for “daily family services.” Id. at 55. Together these actions 
amounted to a spouse-like relationship. Id. While in one sense Braschi is a radical 
opinion—the first to recognize the legal status of same-sex partners as quasi-spouses—it is 
also extremely conservative because it projects onto unmarried persons a normative image 
of marriage. See, e.g., Ristroph & Murray, supra note 11, at 1256 n.89 (arguing that the 
Braschi court “used the normative concept of marriage to inform its understanding of 
family”). Most significant for this Article’s purposes, Braschi’s functionalist approach is not 
only an opportunity for the law to impose a normative image of marriage onto unmarried 
persons, but also an occasion to create that normative image in the first instance. Without a 
case like Braschi, the law would have less of an opportunity to reflect on what marriage is 
or should be.  
  62. Unless, of course, those married persons are a citizen and a noncitizen. See, 
e.g., Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 
1625, 1672 (2007) (noting that federal immigration law makes inquiries into whether a 
couple “married for love or in a ‘sham, phony, empty ceremony’ intended only to facilitate 
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After the couple enters into marriage, and unless and until it divorces, the state 
plays a minimal role in directly regulating it.63 As Professor Case has argued, 
“‘Married couples in this society are not required to do the rather conservative 
things’ courts and regulators typically require of unmarried couples, whether of the 
same or of opposite sexes, as a condition for relationship recognition.”64 Were the 
law to require married persons to be financially interdependent or even to love 
each other, it would certainly be violating a relationship that the Supreme Court 
has made clear receives vigorous constitutional protection under the mantle of 
marital privacy.65 
Marital privacy, however, does not apply to marginal relationships like 
domestic partnerships. Nor, importantly, does it prohibit the law from using 
marginality as a space in which to reflect on what marriage should ideally be—a 
space in which to define marriage, as Professor Case might put it, in “thick” 
terms.66 As Sanford Katz has remarked, “In a certain sense the domestic 
partnership laws define what some may say is the ideal marriage.”67 Ideally, 
married persons would be emotionally and physically intimate. Ideally, married 
persons would be economically interdependent. Ideally, married persons would 
assume “specialized or collaborative roles in furtherance of their life together.”68 
And ideally, married persons would be in love.69 What the law cannot do directly 
(impose these ideals on married persons) it therefore does indirectly (by imposing 
them on domestic partners).  
                                                                                                            
immigration status for one of the spouses”). In this sense, immigration law is another 
instance of the law regulating at the margins—projecting its normative commitments (that 
all marriages be for love) onto those who can be regulated (noncitizens).  
  63. The state, of course, regulates marriage directly at the outset by setting forth 
the substantive requirements (gender, age, number) that parties must satisfy in order to enter 
into one. It also regulates marriage on the back end if and when the married couple 
divorces. In fact, divorce constitutes another instance of the law regulating the substance of 
marriage at the margins—in that case, at the margins of the marital relationship itself. See, 
e.g., Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 
76 (2004) (observing that divorce law offers another opportunity for the state “to help shape 
the social understanding of marriage, and thus the actions of those who partake in it”); see 
also Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy by 
Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1533, 1545–46 (1998); Carolyn J. Frantz, Should the 
Rules of Marital Property Be Normative?, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265; Meyer, supra note 
22, at 580–81; Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 
76 VA. L. REV. 9, 27 (1990).  
  64. Case, What Feminists Have to Lose, supra note 12, at 1203 (quoting Case, 
Couples and Coupling, supra note 12, at 1665).  
  65. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
  66. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
  67. Sanford N. Katz, Marriage as Partnership, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 
1269 (1998). 
  68. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 56, § 6.03(7)(d). 
  69. See Abrams, supra note 62, at 1672 (noting that federal immigration law 
requires marriages between citizens and noncitizens to be based on love).  
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B. De Facto Parenthood: Creating the Ideal Parent 
If the marriage-equality movement and domestic partnership legislation 
typify law creating the ideal marriage, then the de facto parent doctrine typifies 
law creating the ideal parent. Under that doctrine, non-legal parents who act 
enough like a parent can obtain parental rights, including custody and visitation.70 
Courts invoking the doctrine have relied on a variety of factors to determine 
whether a non-parent figure qualifies as a de facto parent, including whether the 
non-parent “assumed the obligations of parenthood by taking significant 
responsibility for the child’s care, education and development” and whether the 
non-parent “has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have 
established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.”71  
Similarly, the ALI has recommended that the definition of “parent” be 
expanded to include a de facto parent, who, in its view, is someone who has 
“regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as great as that of the 
person with whom the child primarily lived.”72 The ALI defines “caretaking 
functions” to include the following: 
(a)  satisfying the nutritional needs of the child, managing the 
child’s bedtime and wake-up routines, caring for the child when sick 
or injured, being attentive to the child’s personal hygiene needs 
including washing, grooming, and dressing, playing with the child 
and arranging for recreation, protecting the child’s physical safety, 
and providing transportation; 
(b)  directing the child’s various developmental needs, 
including the acquisition of motor and language skills, toilet 
training, self-confidence, and maturation;  
(c)  providing discipline, giving instruction in manners, 
assigning and supervising chores, and performing other tasks that 
attend to the child’s needs for behavioral control and self-restraint;  
(d)  arranging for the child’s education, including remedial or 
special services appropriate to the child’s needs and interests, 
communicating with teachers and counselors, and supervising 
homework;  
(e)  helping the child to develop and maintain appropriate 
interpersonal relationships with peers, siblings, and other family 
members;  
(f)  arranging for health-care providers, medical follow-up, 
and home health care;  
                                                                                                            
  70. Lindsy J. Rohlf, Note, The Psychological-Parent and De Facto-Parent 
Doctrines: How Should the Uniform Parentage Act Define “Parent”?, 94 IOWA L. REV. 691 
(2009). 
  71. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551 (N.J. 2000) (quoting In re Custody of 
H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995)) (finding that the same-sex partner of a 
biological mother qualified as a parent entitled to custody and/or visitation rights under the 
de facto parent doctrine). 
  72. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 56, § 2.03(1)(c)(ii)(B).  
62 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 54:43 
(g)  providing moral and ethical guidance;  
(h) arranging alternative care by a family member, babysitter, 
or other child-care provider or facility, including investigation of 
alternatives, communication with providers, and supervision of 
care.73 
De facto parenthood and the doctrine that established it provide the law 
with an opportunity to create the ideal parent.74 Supreme Court landmarks like 
Meyer v. Nebraska,75 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,76 and Wisconsin v. Yoder77 
protect parental autonomy in the domain of child rearing. As such, they effectively 
prohibit the state from requiring that all parents “manag[e] the child’s bedtime and 
wake-up routines,” “giv[e] instruction in manners,” and “provid[e] moral and 
ethical guidance.”78 (Imagine what would happen if a state were to legally require 
parents to instill “manners” in their children.) Those cases, we might say, define 
parenthood in thin terms. 
Those cases do not, however, extend constitutional protection to marginal 
or non-traditional parent–child relationships like de facto parenthood. Nor do they 
prohibit the law from using de facto parenthood as a frame in which to construct 
and communicate a “thick” vision of parent–child relations for everyone. Ideally, 
all parents would help their children “to develop and maintain appropriate 
interpersonal relationships.”79 Ideally, all parents would be attentive to their 
children’s “hygiene.”80 And ideally, all parents would provide “moral and ethical 
                                                                                                            
  73. Id. § 2.03(5).  
  74. In addition, de facto parent definitions like the ALI’s provide the law with an 
opportunity to articulate the ideal distribution of labor between parents (assuming that there 
are two parents to distribute labor between). For instance, the ALI suggests that a non-
parent, in order to be considered a de facto parent, must have either “regularly performed a 
majority of the caretaking functions for the child” or “regularly performed a share of 
caretaking functions at least as great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily 
lived.” Id. § 2.03(1)(c)(ii)(A)–(B). On this view, the parent who performs less than 50% of 
his or her share of caretaking functions is, in the eyes of the law, somehow less of a parent 
than the parent who does at least 50%. If this is the case, then recent empirical research 
indicating that most two-parent households do not split child-care labor in a proportion even 
remotely approximating 50–50 is, to say the least, revealing. For an article summarizing 
these studies, see Lisa Belkin, When Mom and Dad Share It All, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2008, 
§ MM (Magazine), at 44.  
  75. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a state law that prohibited foreign 
language education violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because 
it unduly interfered with parental autonomy).  
  76. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that a state law that required public school 
attendance violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it unduly 
interfered with parental autonomy).  
  77. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (finding that a state compulsory school law that 
required students to attend school past the eighth grade violated, in part, the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it unduly interfered with Amish parents’ 
parental autonomy).  
  78. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 56, § 2.03(5)(a), (c), (g).  
  79. Id. § 2.03(5)(e).  
  80. Id. § 2.03(5)(a). 
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guidance” for their children.81 Prohibited by the Constitution from imposing those 
ideals on all parents directly, the law indirectly nudges parents toward satisfying 
them by regulating parenthood at the margins.  
C. Alternative Reproduction: Perfecting Procreation 
Commentators have already observed the extent to which alternative 
procreation82 reproduces the traditional family through the private preferences of 
those who have availed themselves of it. Professor Dorothy Roberts, for instance, 
argues that alternative reproduction, while a cutting edge technology that in one 
sense challenges the traditional family model,83 more often than not profoundly 
reinforces it. She points to the fact that couples using sperm banks to procreate 
regularly choose donors on the basis of race in an effort to reproduce the racial 
make-up of their own family—which is usually white, given that these 
technologies “are used almost exclusively by affluent white people.”84  
Less critically appraised, however, is the extent to which the law, rather 
than private actors, has used alternative procreation as an occasion to establish the 
ideal family as well as the conditions under which procreation should ideally 
occur. Take, for instance, a 2007 bill that Donald Carcieri, then Governor of 
Rhode Island, vetoed. The bill required that fertility-related insurance coverage be 
extended to unmarried persons, who are currently excluded from such coverage 
because they do not satisfy the condition of marriage.85 In his veto message, 
Carcieri commented that he vetoed the bill because “[a]s a matter of public policy, 
the state should be encouraging the birth of children to two-parent families, not the 
reverse.”86 Similarly, lawmakers in some states have sponsored legislation that 
would categorically prohibit fertility providers from “offering and performing any 
medical procedure on an unmarried woman for the purpose of conception or 
                                                                                                            
  81. Id. § 2.03(5)(g). 
  82. Alternative procreation is defined here as the panoply of ways that persons 
conceive and bear children through assisted means, including artificial insemination, sperm 
donation, and in vitro fertilization. See Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra 
note 3, at 911 (listing the various assisted reproductive technologies (“ARTs”)).  
  83. Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935, 
935 (1996); see also Rao, supra note 23, at 952 (referring to the potential for ARTs “to 
undermine the traditional [familial] paradigm”); id. at 958–59 (“At the most obvious level, 
assisted reproductive technologies enable the formation of families by gay men, lesbians, 
single people, and post-menopausal women, visibly assaulting the traditional image of the 
two-parent, heterosexual, biologically-connected family.” (emphasis added)). 
  84. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 244 (1995); see 
also Roberts, supra note 83, at 936 (stating that ARTs “rarely serve to subvert conventional 
family norms” and that “[m]ost often they complete a traditional nuclear family by 
providing a married couple with a child”).  
  85. See R.I. Governor Blocks Infertility Bill, USA TODAY, July 19, 2007, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2007-07-19-fertility-treatment_N htm.  
  86. Id.; see also Lisa Vernon-Sparks, Expanded Infertility Coverage Vetoed, 
PROVIDENCE J., Jul. 20, 2007, at B1 (recounting the remarks of a spokesperson for the 
Governor that “[t]he Governor believes that the two-parent family provides a more stable 
environment”).  
64 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 54:43 
procreation.”87 While such bills were ultimately dropped, their “mere introduction 
caused alarm among those who favor equal access to [assisted reproductive 
technology] regardless of marital status.”88  
In addition, as mentioned in this Article’s Introduction, alternative 
procreation has provided the law with an opportunity to articulate a vision of 
procreation as race neutral and incest preventative. For example, some 
commentators have argued that the law should limit the number of children born 
from any one individual’s donated sperm in order to prevent “accidental incest.”89 
“In an age of easy travel, donor secrecy, and limited understanding of genetics,” 
they contend, “reducing the number of children that can be born from each donor 
reduces the possibility of inadvertent consanguinity.”90 Other commentators have 
urged the law to take more seriously sperm banks’ practice of organizing donors 
according to their racial background. While recognizing that sperm banks and the 
commercial transactions that they facilitate are private and therefore not reachable 
under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, these commentators argue that 
“racially salient forms of donor disclosure are pernicious social practices, which, 
while operating beyond the reach of the law, ought to be condemned as bad 
policy.”91  
Imagine the fate of the law that placed these demands—or ideals—on 
sexual procreation and on the sexual relationships that might lead to it. For 
instance, the constitutional right to procreate arguably prohibits the law from 
requiring that persons be married in order to have children.92 Similarly, the 
procreative right, along with the right to sexual autonomy recognized in Lawrence 
v. Texas,93 arguably prohibits the law from punishing men who have sex and 
                                                                                                            
  87. Daar, supra note 15, at 20. 
  88. Id.  
  89. Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the Line—Or the Curtain?—For 
Reproductive Technology, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 59 (2009); see also Jacqueline Mroz, 
From One Sperm Donor, 150 Children, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2011, at D1 (discussing the 
accidental incest fear in the context of the unregulated sperm donation industry).  
  90. Cahn, supra note 89, at 102.  
  91. Fox, supra note 5, at 1844, 1846–47; see also Dov Fox, Choosing Your 
Child’s Race, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2011) [hereinafter Fox, Choosing Your Child’s 
Race].  
  92. See, e.g., Robertson, Embryos, supra note 3, at 962–63 (“Given the personal 
significance of reproduction, it would seem to deserve protection for unmarried as well as 
married persons. . . . [B]anning coital or noncoital conception by single persons seems 
absurd when unmarried sexual relations are common and when single women cannot be 
forced to use contraception or to abort after pregnancy has occurred.”). It likely does not, 
however, prohibit states like Rhode Island from requiring that individuals be married in 
order to be insured for reproductive assistance. A state insurance law that requires persons 
to be married in order to receive insurance benefits for third-party reproductive assistance 
(as in Rhode Island) does not run afoul of constitutional privacy guarantees any more than 
does a federal law that bans the use of Medicaid funds for most abortions. See Maher v. 
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). As in the abortion context, so too in the third-party reproductive 
assistance context would the Court—were it to hear a constitutional challenge to a law like 
Rhode Island’s—almost certainly draw a distinction between negative and positive rights 
and find that Skinner only protects the former, not the latter. 
  93. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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procreate with several women—even if that procreation might lead to accidental 
incest because of the possibility of multiple siblings who do not know each other.94 
Finally, the rights to sexual and procreative autonomy arguably prohibit the law 
from requiring that individuals sexually reproduce in race-neutral ways. In sum, it 
would be fair to say that the constitutional rights to sexual and procreative 
autonomy collectively advance a rather thin normative vision of procreation, one 
that does not burden those who procreate in traditional (i.e., sexual) ways with the 
reproductive preferences that saturate most discussions about alternative 
procreation.  
The same constitutional rights that protect traditional sexual procreation, 
however, do not necessarily apply to non-sexual procreation. As one commentator 
argues, “Autonomy interests are implicated differently in assisted reproduction 
than they are in sexual reproduction or romantic dating.”95 “What is present in the 
romantic matching context that is missing in the reproductive matching context,” 
he contends, “is meaningful interface between the parties on either side of the 
exchange.”96 Nor, importantly, do those constitutional rights prohibit 
commentators and policymakers from using legal issues surrounding non-sexual 
procreation as an occasion to signal what they would like all procreation to look 
like—marital, controlled, race blind, or all of those things. As with marriage and 
parenthood, procreation emerges from the legal regulation of its non-traditional 
form as something that is considerably thicker than the Constitution would 
normally permit.  
III. REGULATING AT THE MARGINS 
Part II’s survey of family law matters involving the regulation of 
marginal kinship complicates family law’s conventional logic. First, given the 
extent to which the law uses non-traditional kinship as an occasion to bring a 
normative vision of traditional kinship into focus, we can hardly say that 
traditional and non-traditional kinship structures are separate and distinct. To treat 
them as though they were, as some family law commentators do,97 is to obscure 
the dynamic relationship that actually exists between them. 
                                                                                                            
  94. In the context of sexual sperm donation, the situation in which accidental 
incest would most likely occur would be if a man were having sex with many women, 
which would inevitably involve extramarital sexual relations given that 
polygamy/polyamory is illegal in every state. See MARKEL ET AL., supra note 49, at 71. If 
the man were married, then those extramarital sexual relations would constitute adultery, 
which continues to be criminal in some states even after Lawrence. See id. Even if the man 
is not married, his extramarital sexual activity might constitute criminal fornication in those 
states that continue to criminalize extramarital sex. However, criminal fornication statutes, 
as the Virginia Supreme Court recently recognized in Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 371 
(Va. 2005), are unconstitutional after Lawrence because they criminalize the only kind of 
sex—that of the extramarital variety—in which gays and lesbians from those states that do 
not recognize same-sex marriage can legally engage.  
  95. Fox, supra note 5, at 1882. 
  96. Fox, Choosing Your Child’s Race, supra note 91, at 11.  
  97. See supra Part I.A. 
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Second, the shadow metaphor that commentators have invoked to 
describe the relationship between traditional and non-traditional kinship98 could 
easily work the other way. To be sure, it is certainly true that “[h]istorically, 
marriage has functioned as a gnomon, the central pillar of a sundial, casting 
shadows outward” and determining the relationships of even unmarried persons.99 
And it is certainly true that the legitimacy of non-traditional relationships is often 
measured by the extent to which they approximate the nuclear marital model.100 In 
this sense, non-traditional intimacy is indeed determined and overshadowed by 
traditional types.  
It is also true, however, that family law’s central institutions, including 
marriage, are brought into focus most clearly when the law regulates the marginal 
space outside of them. Without the non-traditional couple, the law would never 
have the opportunity to reflect on what marriage is (or should be) in the first place, 
protected as that institution is by the robust privacy norms that prohibit the state 
from talking about it in a very substantive way. When viewed in this light, the 
margins define and determine the center no less than the center defines and 
determines them.  
Finally, it is simply not true, as the conventional family law narrative 
insists, that the law has “little to say” about what traditional kinship ought to look 
like,101 or that “[t]he living standards of a family are a matter of concern to the 
household, and not for the courts to determine.”102 The law, as the above examples 
show, has quite a lot to say about what traditional kinship ought to look like on a 
substantive level—about what traditional marriage, parenthood, and procreation 
should ideally be. It simply expresses those normative commitments indirectly 
rather than directly by regulating non-traditional intimate and family life. Put 
differently, the constitutional guarantees that prohibit the law from directly 
regulating “[t]he living standards of a family”103 do nothing to constrain it from 
                                                                                                            
  98. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text. 
  99. Dubler, supra note 16, at 1645.  
100. See, e.g., Ristroph & Murray, supra note 11, at 1256 (“[S]eeming departures 
from the marital family ideal may be less radical than they first appear.”).  
101. Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and 
Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1993 (2010); see also Martha M. 
Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 79, 104 (2001) (“One of the reasons that business relationships and intimate 
relationships are described as private is the purported lack of state intervention in those 
relationships. . . . During the course of the relationship, the state generally allows the parties 
to regulate their own affairs.”); Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 40, at 1402 (“[T]here is no 
direct state action involved in how one raises one’s children, engages in sexual intimacy, 
uses contraceptives, terminates a pregnancy, or chooses with whom to live.”). 
102. McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953) (rejecting a wife’s 
suit for maintenance, notwithstanding the husband’s common-law duty of support, on the 
ground that “to maintain [such an action], the parties must be separated or living apart from 
each other,” because otherwise the court would be unduly interfering with the marital 
relationship). McGuire is the common-law duty-of-support case that is used in “most family 
law casebooks . . . to introduce the concept of marital privacy” and one that maintains a 
“paradigmatic stature in American family law.” HARTOG, supra note 32, at 9. 
103. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d at 342. 
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trying to regulate that same family through the back door. The legal regulation of 
non-traditional kinship represents just such an instance of back door regulation.  
On this last point, how can we properly say that the law is trying to 
“regulate” even those forms of intimate and family life that it cannot directly reach 
when it regulates those who exist at the margins? Surely a married heterosexual 
couple does not feel forced to procreate within marriage simply because a court 
upholds the constitutionality of an exclusionary marriage law on the basis of 
procreation. Surely a legal parent does not feel forced to instill a sense of ethics in 
her daughter—or even love her daughter—simply because the law is more likely to 
reward parental rights to those individuals who do those things under the de facto 
parent doctrine. And surely the white man from the hypothetical that opened this 
Article does not feel forced to procreate in race-neutral ways just because the law, 
given its strong commitment to race neutrality, strongly discourages sperm banks’ 
practice of organizing donors on the basis of race. If the regulation of non-
traditional kinship does not directly impose a set of normative commitments on 
those in traditional relationships, then how is it that traditional kinship is being 
“regulated” when the law regulates marginality? Couldn’t it simply be that when 
the law regulates marginality, that is all that it is doing—regulating marginality, 
rather than trying to regulate all of us?  
The “regulation” that this Article contemplates is of an indirect, rather 
than a direct, sort. It is the kind of regulation that commentators envision when 
they talk about the law’s expressive and channeling functions, discussed below. 
A. Marginality and Law’s Expressive Function 
Cass Sunstein defines the law’s expressive function as “the function of 
law in ‘making statements’ as opposed to controlling behavior directly.”104 Much 
of the time, he writes, the law attempts to alter social norms “unaccompanied by 
much in the way of enforcement activity.”105 For instance, laws that require 
individuals to curb their dogs “are rarely enforced through the criminal law.”106 
Nevertheless, such laws “have an important effect in signalling appropriate 
behavior and in inculcating the expectation of social opprobrium and, hence, 
shame in those who deviate from the announced norm.”107 Regardless of whether 
curbing laws are enforced, they “can help reconstruct norms and the social 
meaning of action.”108  
Curbing ordinances represent just one example among many of laws that 
incentivize behavioral shifts in oblique rather than direct ways. Whereas 
sometimes “[n]orm entrepreneurs in the private sector” can help to shape social 
                                                                                                            
104. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2021, 2024 (1996). For law’s expressive function, see also Elizabeth S. Anderson & 
Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 
1503 (2000) and Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 1 (2000).  
105. Sunstein, supra note 104, at 2032 (emphasis omitted).  
106. Id.  
107. Id.  
108. Id. 
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meaning and change collective behavior, often it is the law itself that performs the 
function of “express[ing] a judgment about [an] underlying activity in such a way 
as to alter social norms.”109 “Without understanding the expressive function of 
law,” Sunstein insists, “we will have a hard time getting an adequate handle on 
public views on such issues as civil rights, prostitution, the environment, 
endangered species, capital punishment, and abortion.”110  
Law is expressive when it uses marginality to make normative statements 
and “judgments” about what all forms of intimacy and family life ought to look 
like. While domestic partner legislation and the de facto parent doctrine surely do 
not control married couples and traditional parents directly, they both allow the 
law to express and to signal appropriate behavior in ways that might over time 
alter spousal and parental norms. In this sense, marginality (and its legal 
regulation) exemplifies law’s expressive function, giving it the opportunity to 
construct meaning and to shape human behavior obliquely rather than relying on 
enforcement activity to achieve that same goal directly.111  
B. Marginality and Law’s Channeling Function 
Carl Schneider writes that “in the channelling function the law creates or 
(more often) supports social institutions which are thought to serve desirable 
ends.”112 An underappreciated function of family law, the channeling function in 
the domain of intimate and family life seeks not only to steer individuals into what 
the law regards to be socially desirable institutions—the most notable among them 
being marriage and parenthood—but also to encourage individuals to act in 
normatively desirable ways once they are in those institutions. To be sure, as with 
law’s expressive function, family law’s channeling function “does not primarily 
use direct legal coercion.”113 As much as the law would like to encourage 
individuals to marry, have children, and love their children, “[p]eople are not 
forced to marry. One can contract out (formally or informally) of many of the rules 
underlying marriage. One need not have children, and one is not forced to treat 
them lovingly.”114  
That said, family law is still able to perform a channeling function 
indirectly; in fact, it is primarily through indirect regulation, Schneider argues, that 
                                                                                                            
109. Id. at 2034.  
110. Id. at 2028–29.  
111. Criminal laws (unlike Sunstein’s curbing ordinances) that are enforced, of 
course, regulate both directly and obliquely. For instance, in their thoughtful and 
comprehensive examination of the criminal justice system’s family related benefits and 
burdens, Dan Markel and his co-authors observe that many family-ties burdens “promote a 
certain vision of family life within society” in addition to punishing behavior after it occurs. 
MARKEL ET AL., supra note 49, at 78. “[F]rom the ex ante position,” they argue, 
“criminalizing failures to rescue [or] failures to supervise, . . . and banning incest, adultery, 
or bigamy are all aimed at keeping certain kinds of families together to perform the work 
associated with a certain kind of idealized family life.” Id.  
112. Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 495, 498 (1992).  
113. Id. at 504.  
114. Id. 
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the law’s channeling function works.115 For instance, while family law cannot 
directly force parents to be emotionally invested in their children, it can encourage 
emotional investments indirectly through the law of custody, which rewards such 
investments by looking favorably on them in the best-interest-of-the-child 
calculus.116 In this way, then, “[c]ustody law obliquely sets standards for parental 
behavior and emphasizes the centrality of children’s interests.”117 Family law’s 
channeling function, in other words, indirectly sets standards for ideal parental 
behavior through the law of custody, just as it “indirectly sets some standards for 
marital behavior through the law of divorce.”118  
The legal regulation of marginality serves a channeling function 
analogous to the one that Schneider describes. As shown in Part II, the regulation 
of marginal kinship gives the law an occasion to do what the Constitution would 
ordinarily prohibit it from doing—namely, articulate normative marriage, 
parenthood, and procreation. One need only think here of the profoundly 
normative spouse that emerges from the ALI’s definition of domestic partner, or of 
the profoundly normative parent that emerges from the Institute’s definition of de 
facto parent.119 As such, the legal regulation of marginality performs the 
channeling function of supporting, if only indirectly, “social institutions which are 
thought to serve desirable ends.”120  
Moreover, the legal regulation of marginality represents just the kind of 
“indirect” regulation, or indirect incentivizing, of which Schneider speaks when he 
states that “the channelling function does not primarily use direct legal coercion” 
in its attempt “to create—or, more often, to recruit—social institutions and to mold 
and sustain them.”121 For example, Part II suggested that the law has used the legal 
quest for marriage equality by same-sex couples as an opportunity to put forth a 
normative view of marriage as procreative. While the law of course cannot force 
married persons to procreate in order to stay married, it can try to incentivize them 
to do just that by projecting a vision of marriage that is inherently procreative—
and by consistently endorsing that vision in a public way.  
                                                                                                            
115. See id. at 513 (“Channelling primarily works . . . obliquely and interstitially. 
That is, it does not set all the terms of behavior within an institution, but rather creates a 
system of incentives and disincentives that touch participants only in places, not 
globally. . . . In short, because channelling often uses only indirect and moderate 
force, . . . its power and utility are limited.”).  
116. See id. at 503. 
117. Id.  
118. Id. at 502; see also Baker, supra note 63, at 1548–49 (“As it has emerged to 
date, the law affords negative parental rights to married parents because the primary parent–
child relationship is so important to both parent and child, but the law ignores the 
importance of that primary relationship once parents are divorced or if they were never 
married.”).  
119. See supra notes 56–59, 72–73, 78–81 and accompanying text.  
120. Schneider, supra note 112, at 498.  
121. Id. at 503–04.  
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C. Marginality and Back Door Regulation 
When the law regulates non-traditional kinship, it expresses norms for all 
of us and attempts to channel us into satisfying them. As such, it would be fair to 
say that the legal regulation of marginality serves both an expressive and a 
channeling function. Together, those functions invite us to consider the law’s 
regulation of non-traditional kinship as a form of indirect—or back door—
regulation of everyone, even those whose intimate and familial decisions are 
accorded significant constitutional protection. To be sure, privacy guarantees 
might prohibit the law from imposing a normative conception of the family from 
above. Those guarantees do not, however, prohibit the law from expressing its 
normative commitments about intimate and domestic life, from “establishing” 
ideal models of intimate and family life,122 and, quite possibly, from channeling 
individuals into relationships that approximate those models.  
Admittedly, one might argue that when the law’s normative vision of the 
institutions here discussed—marriage, parenthood, and procreation—does not 
coincide with the descriptive reality of how most people in those institutions 
behave, then the law fails miserably at indirect or back door regulation. Take, for 
instance, the procreation rationale for exclusionary marriage laws. This Article has 
taken the position that the procreation rationale represents a way for the law to 
shape the meaning of marriage (as procreative) for all of us and to thereby channel 
us into marital relationships that conform to that meaning. However, the 
procreation rationale could arguably have the opposite effect. Indeed, the image of 
procreative marriage that has emerged from marriage-equality jurisprudence could 
have the effect of undermining our respect for the law itself. The more that the law 
insists on a normative definition of marriage that is so at odds with the descriptive 
reality of those in that institution, the less influential the law might in fact be in 
regulating married persons.123 
At the same time, though, and as commentators have recognized, courts 
might actually have considerable “power over the public’s perception of 
marriage.”124  
No trained lawyer would think that just because some courts say 
that particular states might have created marriage law in order to 
encourage otherwise irresponsible heterosexuals to procreate 
responsibly that this was really what these states believed. But does 
the public know this? And even if lawyers and judges “know” what 
rational basis review is, don’t they also learn what abstract and 
evanescent concepts like “marriage” mean through the reification 
that occurs when courts make attempts to textually define the 
undefinable?125  
                                                                                                            
122. For the argument that familial liberty requires familial disestablishment no 
less than free religious exercise requires religious disestablishment under the First 
Amendment, see Ristroph & Murray, supra note 11, at 1240.  
123. See, e.g., Abrams & Brooks, supra note 34, at 33–35.  
124. Id. at 33.  
125. Id. at 33–34.  
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To be sure, corporations and the media know quite well that the 
communication or signaling of certain ideals—however ridiculous they might 
seem at first glance—can, over time, change the way that we think about 
something. For instance, a McDonald’s near where I live in Rhode Island recently 
replaced its traditional golden arches for green arches. The company’s move is 
both a descriptive and an aspirational one—a “sign” that it is going green in terms 
of company practices126 as well as an invitation to the public to think about 
McDonald’s in green terms. However absurd that might be—for some the notion 
of a green McDonald’s is oxymoronic at best and downright fraudulent at worst—
seeing the green arches every day on my way to work might, over time, change the 
way that I think about the “king” of fast food. The green arches might even 
encourage me to eat there.  
So too with procreation and the other normative commitments that are 
expressed when the law regulates marginality. However absurd the law’s 
procreative ideals might be for many opposite-sex couples, the frequent 
communication of those ideals might eventually change the way that we think 
about what marriage is or should be. Significantly, advocates bringing 
constitutional claims on behalf of same-sex couples have, over time, conformed to 
the law’s procreative image of marriage. Rather than simply challenge the claim 
that marriage is inherently procreative, litigants now increasingly argue that same-
sex couples are procreative (albeit in a different way), and that they, no less than 
opposite-sex couples, can satisfy a procreative definition of marriage.127 It is no 
coincidence that many of the named plaintiffs in marriage-equality litigation have 
children themselves, and that children have played an increasingly salient role in 
that litigation.128 If the procreation rationale has changed the way that marriage-
equality advocacy envisions marriage, then who is to say that it could not change 
the way that we all think about that institution? 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
Having thus far been primarily descriptive in scope, this Article now turns 
to more practical considerations. It uses the theory described above—that the law 
                                                                                                            
126. See McDonald’s Going Green, CNBC.COM (Sept. 15, 2009, 8:40 AM), 
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=1254427329.  
127.  See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 53, Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) (No. CV-
04-4001813) (arguing that the procreation rationale for marriage prohibitions is over-
inclusive because some same-sex couples are procreative). 
128.  See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 761 n.23 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006) (Kline, J., concurring and dissenting) (summarizing the testimony of a 
plaintiff’s daughter in marriage-equality litigation), rev’d, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), 
superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, amendment ruled 
unconstitutional by Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. 
Feb. 7, 2012); Respondents’ Opening Brief on the Merits at 15, In re Marriage Cases, 183 
P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S147999) (providing a marriage-equality plaintiff’s testimony 
regarding the harm that her son suffered as a consequence of a state law prohibiting her 
from marrying); see also Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 
15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 239 (2006) (discussing “the deployment of children” in 
marriage-equality litigation). 
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expresses its normative ideals for everyone by regulating those who exist at the 
margins of intimate and familial life—to advance a new constitutional argument: 
The law burdens non-traditional kinship on an expressive level by using it as a 
vehicle to regulate all of us, and those expressive burdens sometimes violate the 
Constitution’s guarantee of equality. To be clear, other commentators have 
elucidated the deeply expressive dimensions of intimate relationships and have 
identified the constitutional infirmities of regulating non-traditional intimacy in a 
way that impermissibly burdens expressive interests. Most notable in this regard is 
Professor Kenneth Karst, who famously argued that legal regimes that burden non-
traditional intimacy violate a “freedom of intimate association” that the 
Constitution staunchly protects.129 Drawing from, but expanding on, Professor 
Karst’s insights, this Article contends that the law’s regulation of marginal kinship 
raises serious constitutional concerns not just because that regulation burdens 
marginal actors’ right to express themselves through their relationships, as 
Professor Karst has so eloquently argued and so cogently demonstrated. In 
addition, the law’s regulation of marginal kinship raises serious constitutional 
concerns because sometimes it represents the law using marginal kinship, and only 
marginal kinship, in a purely expressive way to communicate the law’s normative 
ideals—ideals that traditional kinship never has to satisfy and that non-traditional 
kinship often cannot satisfy. Under this view, the Constitution is violated when the 
law effectively uses marginal kinship for no other reason than to be expressive—
that is, for no other reason than to express or communicate the law’s deep 
normative commitments. 
Take, for instance, exclusionary marriage laws, which advocates and 
commentators have alternatively argued violate constitutional guarantees of due 
process, equal protection (as a form of sex and sexual orientation discrimination), 
and free expression.130 Only two courts have found that marriage restrictions 
violate the fundamental right to marry under a state constitution (California) and 
under the Federal Constitution.131 With some notable exceptions, most courts have 
dismissed both the sex and the sexual orientation discrimination arguments, either 
finding that marriage laws do not discriminate on the basis of sex132 or that they 
                                                                                                            
129. See Karst, supra note 1, at 626–30 (defining the emergence of a “freedom of 
intimate association” in constitutional jurisprudence).  
130. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians 
and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Clifford J. Rosky, Perry 
v. Schwarzenegger and the Future of Same-Sex Marriage Law, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 913 (2011); 
Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 471 (2001). 
131. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(finding that California’s constitutional marriage prohibition violates the due process and 
equality guarantees of the Federal Constitution), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-
16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 
at 452 (holding the prohibition unconstitutional under the California Constitution). 
132. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10 (N.Y. 2006) (rejecting the 
sex discrimination argument); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 & n.13 (Vt. 1999) (same). 
Other courts that have struck down exclusionary marriage laws on state constitutional 
grounds have declined to consider the sex discrimination claim. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 
763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). To date, only one court has held that marriage laws constitute 
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permissibly discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation,133 a non-suspect 
classification entitled to minimal judicial scrutiny.134 And no high court in any 
state has seriously considered the First Amendment claim—that is, the argument 
that marriage restrictions violate the constitutional right to free expression.135 
Moreover, commentators have variously objected to some of these arguments on 
normative grounds. Most recently, Professor Case has criticized the marriage-
equality movement for abandoning the sex discrimination argument in favor of the 
sexual orientation discrimination claim and the thick understanding of sexual 
orientation identity on which that claim rests.136  
Advocates and commentators have overlooked an additional argument for 
why exclusionary marriage laws are unconstitutional, one that might be more 
palatable to those who object on normative grounds to some of the standard 
constitutional arguments against those laws. According to this argument, 
exclusionary marriage laws violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection 
because they burden same-sex couples, but not opposite-sex married persons, on 
an expressive level by subjecting same-sex couples, and only same-sex couples, to 
the law’s procreative ideal. For instance, as discussed in Parts II and III, the 
procreation rationale and the two-biological-parents rationale are best, and perhaps 
only, understood in normative terms: expressive projections of what the law would 
like for all married persons to be doing (procreating and raising biological 
children), even if many of those couples are not. In Parts II and III, I suggested that 
those expressive projections are an instance of back door regulation: What the 
Constitution prohibits the law from doing directly (imposing procreative demands 
on heterosexual married persons), the law attempts to achieve indirectly (by 
effectively imposing those same impossible demands on unmarried same-sex 
couples).  
When the law uses non-traditional kinship (here, same-sex relationships) 
as a vehicle through which to express and establish ideal projections or models of 
                                                                                                            
a presumptively unconstitutional form of sex discrimination. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 
44 (Haw. 1993) (plurality opinion), superseded by constitutional amendment, HAW. CONST. 
art. I, § 23 (amended 1998). In Perry, a federal district court held that a state marriage 
prohibition was an impermissible form of sexual orientation discrimination under the 
Federal Constitution, although it recognized the deep interconnectedness between sex and 
sexual orientation discrimination. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 996 (“[S]ex and sexual 
orientation are necessarily interrelated, as an individual’s choice of romantic or intimate 
partner based on sex is a large part of what defines an individual’s sexual orientation.”). A 
divided Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-
16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *26–29 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012). 
133. See, e.g., Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 10–12. But see Perry, 2012 WL 372713, 
at *28 (finding that Proposition 8 violates the Federal Constitution’s Equal Protection 
Clause because it impermissibly discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation); Varnum, 
763 N.W.2d at 862 (finding that Iowa’s marriage exclusion constituted an impermissible 
form of sexual orientation discrimination under the Iowa Constitution).  
134. See Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 10–12.  
135. For the First Amendment argument, see David B. Cruz, “Just Don’t Call It 
Marriage”: The First Amendment and Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 925 (2001). 
136. See Case, What Feminists Have to Lose, supra note 12, at 1204–05.  
74 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 54:43 
intimate and family life for everyone, it directly subjects non-traditional kinship, 
but not traditional kinship, to distinctly expressive burdens.137 Viewed in this light, 
exclusionary marriage laws violate equal protection because they withhold the 
tangible and intangible benefits of marriage from same-sex couples—benefits that 
opposite-sex couples are eligible to enjoy. In addition, exclusionary marriage laws 
violate equal protection because they use non-traditional—but not traditional—
kinship in a purely expressive or normative way. As such, they treat non-
traditional relationships differently, and ultimately less favorably, than traditional 
relationships.  
Other commentators have argued that sometimes “the constitutional 
wrong inheres in what the law expresses.”138 “[I]t is the expressive character of 
state action,” they maintain, “that determines whether a law or policy violates 
Equal Protection.”139 For instance, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme 
Court found that racial segregation was unconstitutional not necessarily because it 
caused concrete harm—to be sure, the Brown Court itself declared that “[s]eparate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal;”140 rather, the Court found that racial 
segregation was unconstitutional because of what that segregation expressed—
namely, “a message of unequal worth.”141 
This Article similarly argues that an equality violation might sometimes 
inhere in the expressive dimension of legal regulation. Admittedly, unlike the 
message expressed by segregation, the message expressed by the legal regulation 
of any form of non-traditional kinship considered above is not itself morally 
objectionable. Procreation (in the marriage-equality context) and incest prevention 
(in the alternative procreation context) are not inherently bad—in fact, many 
would say quite the opposite. Nevertheless, those in non-traditional intimate and 
family structures are treated with unequal “concern” by the law when it imposes 
expressive burdens on them and on them alone.142 In this sense, we might say that 
the constitutional wrong inheres not in what the law expresses but rather in how 
the law expresses—namely, in an uneven way.  
Importantly, this Article does not posit that the law always violates 
equality guarantees when it treats traditional and non-traditional kinship differently 
on an expressive level. Consider, for instance, the de facto parent doctrine. Earlier, 
this Article suggested that the doctrine presents the law with an opportunity to 
craft a normative parental model—one that the law could not impose on most 
                                                                                                            
137. Importantly, this Article recognizes that traditional kinship is being regulated 
on an expressive level when the law regulates non-traditional kinship; indeed, that is one of 
its main descriptive points. The salient difference, however, between those forms of 
regulation is this: Whereas non-traditional kinship bears expressive burdens directly, 
traditional kinship bears them only indirectly.  
138. Hellman, supra note 104, at 2.  
139. Id. at 5–6.  
140. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (emphasis added). On this point, Hellman observes 
that “[t]he opinion’s authors probably used the term ‘inherently’ both for emphasis and to 
forestall any attempts to show that particular children in particular schools were not affected 
by the stigma.” Hellman, supra note 104, at 9.  
141. Hellman, supra note 104, at 10.  
142. Id.  
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parents directly without running afoul of the Constitution.143 On one view, de facto 
parent statutes or doctrines are unfair because they burden non-traditional 
parenthood with expressive projections that traditional (legal) parenthood would 
never have to satisfy.  
On another view, however, those statutes or doctrines are entirely sound 
because the law burdens de facto parents with good reason. Stringent de facto 
parenthood definitions protect the fundamental rights of legal parents to raise their 
children in a way that they see fit. Absent a thick definition of what (or who) a de 
facto parent is, any person could conceivably step in and intrude on a preexisting 
parent–child relationship, one whose constitutional dimensions the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed in Troxel v. Granville.144  
Similarly, on one view, the law would burden non-traditional procreation 
on an expressive level were it to prohibit, say, sperm banks from organizing 
donors on the basis of race because it is normatively desirable to do so. Whereas 
the law could never tell traditional procreators to procreate in race-neutral ways, it 
might use the legal regulation of alternative procreation as an occasion to express 
that normative ideal. While perhaps unfair—why should non-traditional 
procreators have to sacrifice choice on the altar of race neutrality?—one might 
argue that our societal commitments to colorblindness are so strong that they 
trump our societal commitment to procreative freedom (assuming that we even 
have such a commitment for those who procreate in non-traditional ways).  
This is not to say, then, that equal protection is violated every time that 
the law imposes a thick vision of intimate and family life onto non-traditional 
kinship. Rather, it is simply to say that we need to be more attentive to the myriad 
ways in which the legal regulation of marginal kinship presents an occasion for the 
law to be expressive in a way that the Constitution would normally prohibit. 
Sometimes, as in the case of de facto parenthood, the thick understanding of 
intimate and family life that flows from the legal regulation of marginal kinship 
will be justified. Other times, as in the case of exclusionary marriage laws, it will 
not be. At the very least, the law must offer some justification—other than that it 
can—for directly burdening non-traditional kinship, but not traditional kinship, 
with normative projections. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that family law has overlooked a critical way in 
which the law attempts to control intimate and family life and to establish an ideal 
conception of it. By regulating at the margins, the law gives the state an 
                                                                                                            
143. See supra Part II.B. 
144. 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion) (striking down the State of 
Washington’s version of a non-parent visitation statute because its expansiveness intruded 
on the fundamental right of the legal parent to make custodial and visitation decisions with 
respect to her children). The Troxel Court reaffirmed the fundamental right that exists 
between child and (legal) parent, observing that “there will normally be no reason for the 
State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that 
parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children,” 
including the sorts of custodial and visitation decisions at issue in that case. Id. at 68–69. 
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opportunity to regulate all of us. In addition, this Article has contended that 
marginal regulation sometimes raises serious constitutional concerns.  
This Article recognizes that the law regulates indirectly that which it 
cannot regulate directly all of the time. For instance, while the law cannot tell legal 
parents how to act,145 it can regulate the parent–child relationship through the law 
of custody, which privileges one kind of parent–child relationship over another,146 
and through the criminal law, which imposes criminal liability on those parents 
who act unreasonably in certain instances.147 Moreover, the criminal law indirectly 
communicates normative kinship preferences by extending privileges to certain 
kinds of families but not to others.148 Finally, the criminal law advocates a certain 
vision of the family by choosing which family-related activities to criminalize in 
the first place.149  
The objective of this Article, then, has not been to suggest that the legal 
regulation of marginality is the only way that the law regulates intimate and family 
life through the back door. Rather, its aim has been to uncover a neglected and 
underappreciated form of back door regulation, one that could play an important 
role in shoring up constitutional arguments regarding laws, like exclusionary 
marriage regimes, that selectively and expressively burden non-traditional 
relationships and practices.  
 In concluding, this Article invites readers to consider the wide-ranging 
influence that the law has over everyone, and not just over those whom it directly 
regulates. Opponents of same-sex marriage know this well, as their opposition to 
same-sex marriage derives from a belief that marriage equality would directly 
affect them even though they lack a particularized interest in that relationship 
                                                                                                            
145. Absent, of course, telling them not to inflict violence on their children in a 
way that would amount to criminal abuse. Even here, however, every state extends to legal 
parents the privilege of invoking the “parental discipline defense” in abuse prosecutions. 
This defense “exempts parents from prosecutions for assault if the corporal punishment was 
used to ‘benefit’ the child and if the nature of the punishment was objectively reasonable.” 
MARKEL ET AL., supra note 49, at 9.  
146. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 112, at 503 (“Custody law obliquely sets 
standards for parental behavior and emphasizes the centrality of children’s interests.”).  
147. See MARKEL ET AL., supra note 49, at 66–69 (discussing parental 
responsibility laws).  
148. See id. at 60 (“When the state makes choices regarding families and uses the 
criminal justice system to send normative signals about those choices, it risks marginalizing 
persons who consider themselves family members but are not recognized as such by the 
state or other institutions.”).  
149. See id. at 77–78 (discussing the way in which family law burdens in the 
criminal justice system operate to promote the law’s normative vision of the family from an 
ex ante perspective); Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and 
the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1279 (2009) (discussing the 
ways in which criminal and family law alike have “construct[ed] a normative ideal of 
intimate life and provid[ed] the substantive content for this vision”).  
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(other than that same-sex marriage offends them on any number of moral 
grounds).150  
Proponents of marriage equality have been less successful in driving this 
point home. Rather than argue that discriminatory marriage regimes—predicated 
as they so often are on an image of the nuclear family as procreative and 
biological—affect everyone, they have focused instead on the harm that same-sex 
couples experience individually. But as this Article has demonstrated, laws that 
purport to target one class (e.g., same-sex couples) also indirectly target—and may 
even influence—another class (e.g., opposite-sex couples). To overlook this 
phenomenon is to miss just how expansive the law is when it regulates, as well as 
just how interconnected to each other the law’s regulation—and, as the Supreme 
Court acknowledged in Loving v. Virginia, its discrimination—makes us.151  
 
                                                                                                            
150. The “harm” that the general public would suffer by same-sex marriage was 
the source of a recent cartoon in The New Yorker. In it, the cartoonist, Robert Mankoff, 
depicts a wife in her mid-50s walking out the door of her house with two suitcases in hand. 
Presumably in response to her husband’s question why she is leaving him, she answers: 
“There’s nothing wrong with our marriage, but the spectre of gay marriage has hopelessly 
eroded the institution.” Robert Mankoff, Cartoon, THE NEW YORKER, July 26, 2004, at 30.  
151. In Loving, the Supreme Court well understood the expansive reach of racial 
discrimination when it observed that everyone bore the burden of the state’s racial 
prejudice—not just those most immediately affected by it. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
1, 12 (1967) (stating that to deny the right to marry “on so unsupportable a basis as the 
racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the 
principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the 
State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law” (emphasis added)).  
